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A B S T R A C T
Emissions trading is gaining increasing importance around the world as a suitable instrument to address climate
change. In the absence of a global carbon market, however, unilateral carbon policies may end up causing
carbon leakage effects, the more so if carbon prices are to increase in the future to achieve more ambitious
emissions abatement targets. This paper intends to explore the possible delocalization effects of an Emissions
Trading System (ETS) by proposing an evolutionary theoretical model in which regulated firms decide whether
to stay (keep their production activities in the domestic country) or leave (move production abroad where no
ETS is in place) imitating what other firms do. We investigate how this decision is affected by some key ETS
design features, such as the emissions cap, the number of allowances granted for free to ETS firms, the level of
a floor price for allowances. Numerical simulations show that the firms’ decision on whether to abate emissions
or relocate abroad are more sensitive to policies that reduce the cost of green technologies than to changes
in specific features of the ETS design such as the emissions cap, the floor price and the number of permits
granted for free.1. Introduction
Climate change and its detrimental consequences call for urgent
action by national governments. To fight climate change, a growing
number of regions have adopted carbon pricing policies. In particular,
many jurisdictions have implemented Emission Trading Systems (ETSs)
as their preferred carbon pricing instrument. Among them, the most
notable example is certainly the European Emission Trading System
(EU ETS), that represents the first transboundary and world largest
carbon market, but other ETSs have been rapidly growing elsewhere,
including California, Quebec, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), New Zealand, China, Switzerland, etc... As of today, there are
21 ETSs operating in the world, covering 15 per cent of global emis-
∗ Correspondence to: FSR Climate, European University Institute, Via Boccaccio 121, I-50133 Florence, Italy.
E-mail addresses: simone.borghesi@eui.eu, simone.borghesi@unisi.it (S. Borghesi).
1 Burke et al. (2019) estimate that the highest marginal abatement cost (which should be equal to the carbon price at equilibrium) for full decarbonization
by 2050 of regulated sectors in the UK might range between e135 and e225. In simulations on its long-term decarbonization strategy, European Union adopts
a carbon price of e350 (European Commission, 2018). Observed carbon prices are much lower and very far from these values. At the moment of writing, the
highest carbon prices among the existing ETSs can be found in the EU ETS (around e60 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions).
sions, and 24 other systems are already planned or under consideration
(cf. World Bank, 2019; International Carbon Action Partnership, 2020).
In the absence of a global carbon market, the allowance price
differentials observed across existing ETSs and the fact that many
countries have no price for carbon emissions yet raise concerns over
possible carbon leakage effects of ETSs. By this we refer to the risk that
domestic firms subject to high allowance prices may shift their produc-
tion to other geographical areas that have no or laxer environmental
regulations.
The empirical literature has shown little to no evidence of carbon
leakage in the past (see next section for a discussion of the literature).
However, carbon prices have been very low so far, while they are likely
to rapidly increase in the future along with the increasing ambition in
climate policies required by the so-called ratchet-up mechanism of thevailable online 17 September 2021
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Paris Agreement. In this regard, given the urgent challenges posed by
climate change, several governments (e.g. the EU, the United Kingdom,
New Zealand and California) aim to achieve climate neutrality by
2050 (International Carbon Action Partnership, 2020). But achieving
(net) zero emissions will imply a remarkable increase in carbon prices
around the world which would need to grow 10 times or even more in
the next 30 years (Verde, 2020).1 Such an increase, therefore, could put
ETS-regulated producers at a competitive disadvantage inducing them
to offshore their production more and more in the future.
Carbon leakage provisions have been adopted in most ETSs to
prevent delocalization of the regulated entities belonging to the most
vulnerable sectors, often referred to as emissions-intensive, trade ex-
posed (EITE) sectors. Thus, for instance, during the second phase of
the EU ETS (2013–20) the EU decided to exempt from the auctioning of
emission allowances those sectors regarded more at risk of carbon leak-
age, being more carbon intensive and more exposed to international
competitiveness.
Carbon leakage provisions can heavily affect the functioning of
an ETS. On the one hand, if carbon leakage measures are absent or
insufficient, firms may decide to relocate their production activities and
related emissions in other countries. If so, this may severely damage
the environmental effectiveness of ETSs, that is, their capacity to abate
emissions. On the other hand, if the carbon leakage provisions are too
generous (i.e. if too many allocation are given for free to firms belong-
ing to sectors at risk of carbon leakage) this may reduce incentives to
emissions abatement. The impact that the design of an ETS may have
on carbon leakage has spurred a wide debate and a growing litera-
ture in recent years (FSR Climate, 2019). Understanding the possible
effects of an ETS on delocalization is of crucial importance to properly
evaluate its environmental, economic and social consequences. Indeed,
the environmental objective of the domestic carbon pricing policy is
missed if it ends up causing emissions to increase elsewhere. In the
worst case scenario, carbon leakage could even cause global emissions
to increase as argued in the literature on this issue (cf. Branger and
Quirion, 2014; Fowlie and Reguant, 2018). Moreover, if many firms
delocalize their production to escape the ETS, this may adversely affect
domestic production and employment, thus reducing also the inner
acceptability of the ETS.
The aim of this paper is to get a deeper understanding on the
ETS-related risks of carbon leakage and contribute to this debate by
proposing an innovative theoretical framework to address this issue.
For this purpose, differently from previous contributions, we set forth
an evolutionary model in which ETS firms decide whether to stay
(keep their production activities in the domestic country) or leave
(move production abroad where no ETS is in place). We investigate
how this decision is affected by some key ETS design features, such
as the emissions cap, the number of permits granted for free to ETS
firms, the existence and level of a floor price for permits. Moreover,
we assume that firms’ decision on whether to delocalize is also affected
by what other firms decide to do and that firms may act myopically
imitating what other firms do. For this purpose, we assume that firms’
behavior follows the so-called exponential replicator dynamics in which
the most profitable strategy spreads within the firms’ population. The
assumption of bounded rationality underlying replicator dynamics can
capture potential myopia of market participants and firms that has been
underlined as a key element to be taken into account when designing
an ETS (see, e.g., Flachsland et al., 2020).
The structure of the paper will be the following. Section 2 provides
a short review of the related literature, Section 3 describes the model,
Section 4 discusses numerical simulation results, Section 5 provides
some concluding remarks.
2. Related literature
The issue of carbon leakage has become widely discussed in the
lively debate about climate change, because it represents a recurrent2
t
threat that can hinder the effectiveness of environmental regulations.
As greenhouse gas emissions are a global source of environmental
externality, the possibility that some firms escape environmental regu-
lation by relocating abroad can result in an overall weakening of the
effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies.
Carbon leakage can take different forms and can operate through
different channels. In this regard, three main channels have been
identified in the literature (Antimiani et al., 2013; Fowlie and Reguant,
2018; Görlach and Zelljadt, 2018; Cosbey et al., 2019): (i) the out-
put channel, (ii) the investment channel and (iii) the energy market
channel. The first channel suggests that domestic firms may react to
higher compliance costs by relocating their production activities abroad
in the short run. The second channel looks at possible carbon leakage
effects over the long-term arguing that domestic firms may decide to
move abroad due to differences in expected returns. Finally, the en-
ergy market channel suggests that domestic climate policies (especially
when adopted by countries that play a key role at the world level) may
lower the global demand and price of fossil fuels. This may cause a
rebound effect in other jurisdictions that have less stringent climate
policies resulting in an overall increase in their demand of fossil fuels
and related emissions that can more than counterbalance the reduction
in the domestic jurisdiction.
A vast literature has tried to evaluate whether and to what extent
carbon leakage occurs with both ex-ante and ex-post studies which
often reach inconclusive or conflicting results. Ex ante analyses find
a wide range of carbon leakage rates depending on the methodol-
ogy being adopted (general versus partial equilibrium models) and
on the underlying assumptions of the theoretical models (cf. Paltsev,
2001; Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003; Babiker, 2005; Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007).
Computable general equilibrium models generally find much lower
carbon leakage rates as compared to partial equilibrium models which
tend to focus calibrations on the sectors more exposed to the risk of
delocalization.2
Using a large-scale computable general equilibrium model to sim-
ulate the EU’s climate and energy policy and taking international
spillovers into account, Gerlagh and Kuik (2014) find that carbon
leakage rates might be even negative at moderate levels of technolog-
ical spillovers. Indeed, if technological innovation can freely spillover
across countries, domestic mitigation policies could generate efficiency
gains abroad and eventually lead to a reduction (rather than increase)
in foreign emissions.3
Similarly to ex-ante analyses, also ex-post studies find different
results. Most ex post analyses based on empirical estimations tend
to conclude against the existence of carbon leakage, but even in this
case empirical evidence is still mixed and the debate is far from over
(Reinaud, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition,
2019; Ellis et al., 2019; Acworth et al., 2020).
The studies mentioned above refer to different forms of environ-
mental regulations taking all channels of carbon leakage into account.
To further restrict and better specify the perimeter of our analysis in
this paper we focus on possible output relocation (the first channel of
carbon leakage) induced by a specific kind of environmental regulation,
the application of an Emission Trading System.
2 Carbon leakage rates – measured as changes in emissions in the rest of
he world as a percentage of domestic emissions reduction – range between
and 33 per cent in computable general equilibrium models, between 0
nd 100 per cent in partial equilibrium models. See Branger and Quirion
2014), Partnership for Market Readiness (2015), and Carbone and Rivers
2017) for meta-analyses of the estimated effects of unilateral carbon pricing.
3 See also Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011), Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Popp
2002) for empirical evidence on international spillover effects in environmen-
al and energy-saving technologies.




















The competitiveness effects of ETS have been mainly examined by
empirical studies, often focusing on the EU ETS as this is the largest cap-
and-trade system existing up to now.4 Most of the studies (e.g. Reinaud,
2008; Sartor, 2012; Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Jaraite and Di Maria,
2016) conclude that ETS provoked little or no competitiveness effects.
The same holds for three studies (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2015; Aus
dem Moore et al., 2019; Naegele and Zaklan, 2019) which directly
test for carbon leakage caused by the EU ETS by examining shifts in
emission locations rather than competitiveness effects. However, this
conclusion might be affected by the low carbon prices that prevailed
in the markets (particularly in the EU ETS) in the examined periods,
and results might change as carbon prices increase. Moreover, some
more recent country-specific studies seem to find some evidence of
carbon leakage. In particular, using a large data set of German firms
and difference-in-differences estimator, Koch and Basse Mama (2019)
find that the EU ETS had a positive causal effect on outward FDI of
German multinationals, which turns out to be stronger for regulated
sectors that are particularly mobile (e.g. machinery, electrical equip-
ment and automotive sectors). In a similar vein, using a panel data set
of manufacturing regulated Italian firms covering the first two phases
of the EU ETS, Borghesi et al. (2020) find some evidence of carbon
leakage in Italy. In fact, Italian regulated firms operating in sectors
particularly exposed to international competition tended to increase
their FDI and their production in already existing foreign subsidiaries
located in countries not covered by the EU ETS. These country-specific
results seem to suggest that the ETS could have relocation effects, the
more so in the future as carbon prices are expected to progressively
increase to align with more ambitious emission reduction targets.
While the number of empirical studies on the carbon leakage effects
of ETS have been rapidly growing as ETS spread at the global level,
the theoretical literature on this issue is much smaller. Among theo-
retical studies on ETS and relocation, Fischer and Fox (2012) compare
the capacity of alternative policy approaches to reduce carbon leak-
age. Hepburn et al. (2013) use a Cournot oligopoly model to investigate
what is the amount of free allowances that should be given to firms
to preserve industry profits under an ETS compared to an unregulated
system. Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) examine how the allocation of
free permits under an ETS can be used as an instrument to avert
relocation. Using a partial equilibrium model, the authors show that
even if grandfathering (i.e. free allocation of permits based on firms’
historical emissions) is only temporary it may have long run effects on
carbon leakage. In particular, free permits can avert relocation in the
long run if the permits’ price induces sufficiently high investments in
low-carbon technologies that produce a lock-in effect making relocation
unprofitable.
The present paper intends to contribute to the theoretical literature
on ETS and carbon leakage examining the possible relocation effects
of ETS from an evolutionary perspective. This approach differs from
previous studies in the literature on carbon leakage as it can account for
bounded rationality and imitative behaviors that can often be observed
in economic systems. In an evolutionary model, in fact, agents tend
to mimic the others adopting the strategy that turns out to be most
profitable on average within the whole population at present. In the
present context, if moving abroad (to a non-ETS jurisdiction) turns
out to be more profitable than staying at home, ETS-regulated firms
may decide to follow the example of the firms which already offshored
their production. The opposite obviously applies if staying home is on
average more profitable. However, even if a strategy is better than
the other, in an evolutionary context the economic agents do not
change their decision instantaneously. Any decision revision process
takes time to operate. This inertia seems particularly realistic in the
present case in which firms’ decision to move abroad (or come back
4 See Verde (2020), Vivid Economics (2018), Ellis et al. (2019) for recent
eviews of the empirical literature on the competitiveness effects of ETS.3
f
home if domestic conditions become more favorable) may require some
time to be implemented for different reasons (e.g. finding elsewhere
the right conditions and/or hiring the workers that are needed to
operate, overcoming bureaucratic obstacles in the home country or in
the destination country, etc...).
In line with the features and aims described above, in the next
section we present a simple evolutionary model in which each firm
has to decide between two alternative strategies: keeping production
at home or shifting it abroad. Firms decide their production location
looking only at current profits, namely, at which of the two strategies
is more profitable at present but can revise their strategy based on
the relative performance of the two strategies observed within the
economy. This simple theoretical framework will be used to examine
how modifications in some key elements of the ETS design (e.g. the
emissions cap, the number of permits given for free and/or the floor
price level) may influence firms’ decisions concerning their output
production, location of the production and emissions abatement.
3. The model
Let us consider a large number of firms producing a homogeneous
good with a polluting technology. There are two types of firms, ℎ and
𝑟. Firms of type ℎ (ℎ-firms) produce the good in the home country in
which an ETS is at work. Firms of type 𝑟 (𝑟-firms) relocate their activity
to a foreign country. Let us indicate with 𝑥 the share of relocating 𝑟-
firms and with 1 − 𝑥 the share of ℎ-firms that stay at home. Denoting
with 𝑁 the total number of firms, it follows that 𝑥𝑁 represents the
total number of firms that move their production towards non-ETS
jurisdictions, whereas (1−𝑥)𝑁 is the total number of firms that remain
at home.
We denote with 𝑞ℎ and 𝑞𝑟 the amount produced by each ℎ-firm and
𝑟-firm, respectively. For the sake of analytical tractability, we assume
that each unit of production generates one unit of polluting emissions,
therefore we will indicate with 𝑞𝑖 (𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑟) both production and the
resulting emissions.
Each firm maximizes its own profit at each instant of time. We as-
sume that both the output market and the (domestic) carbon market are
perfectly competitive. The regulator of the ETS in the home country can
decide to give domestic firms an amount of permits 𝐹 for free to prevent
them from moving their production activities abroad. This amount can
be sufficient to cover the polluting emissions of firms ℎ (i.e. 𝐹 ≥ 𝑞ℎ)
r not (i.e. 𝐹 < 𝑞ℎ). In the latter case, the firms can decide to buy the
issing permits and/or abate emissions to avoid purchasing permits.
e indicate with 𝑧 the amount of emissions abatement performed by
he each ℎ-firm.
Firms have both fixed and variable production costs. We assume the
atter to be a quadratic function of production. Similarly, abatement
osts are assumed to be a quadratic function of the abatement effort.
.1. Home firms
The profits of each firm that stays at home are:








𝑧2 − 𝑎max(0, 𝑞ℎ − 𝑧 − 𝐹 ) (1)
here 𝑝 indicates the price of the produced good, 𝑞ℎ the amount
roduced by the firm that remains at home, 𝐶𝑣ℎ and 𝐶
𝑓
ℎ denote the
ariable and fixed costs of the firm, respectively, and 𝑎 is the price of
he emission allowances. Finally, 𝜃 > 0 is a parameter which measures
he (in)efficacy of the abatement technology: the higher 𝜃, the higher
he marginal cost of abating emissions using a given technology (the
arginal abatement cost being equal to 𝜃𝑧).
Notice that the last term among brackets on the right hand side of
he profit function represents the demand of emission allowances of
he firm 𝑑𝑎 = max(0, 𝑞ℎ − 𝑧 − 𝐹 ). The latter is obviously lowered by the
ermits received for free and by the abatement activities which set the
irm free from the need to purchase permits.
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level which maximize its profit, subject to the non-negativity con-
straints on 𝑞ℎ and 𝑧, taking the output price 𝑝 and the allowance price
𝑎 as exogenously given (ℎ-firms being price-takers on both the output
market and the carbon market). Based on the output price level 𝑝, we
can distinguish three different sets of solutions maximizing the profit
function:5
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where – given the intervals in which the expressions in (2), (3), (4) are
defined – it is straightforward to verify that 𝑞∗ℎ in (3) is greater than in
(2), that 𝑞∗ℎ in (4) is greater than in (3), and that 𝑧
∗ in (4) is greater
than in (3).
As emerges from equations (2), (3), (4), one can distinguish three
possible cases (and three corresponding optimal values of each vari-
able) depending on the price level of the produced good:
(1) if the price 𝑝 is relatively low, then each ℎ−firm produces an
amount of output (and of emissions) less than or equal to the
number of permits received for free (𝑞∗ℎ =
𝑝
𝐶𝑣ℎ
). No extra permits
are, therefore, needed (𝑑∗𝑎 = 0) and no abatement activity (𝑧∗ =
0) is carried out by the firm (see (2));
(2) if the price 𝑝 has intermediate values (see (3)), then ℎ-firms
increase their production but prefer to abate the corresponding
emissions (𝑧∗ being now positive) rather than buying extra per-
mits on addition of those obtained for free (𝑑∗𝑎 = 0). In this case,





which stimulates firms to look for clean technologies in order to
avoid the costs of purchasing permits;
(3) finally, if the output price 𝑝 is relatively high (see (4)), this




) but also their abatement levels. However, firms now also
buy a positive amount of permits (𝑑∗𝑎 > 0) since the pollution






Let us now focus on the firms that decide to relocate their activities
abroad. In this case, their profit function is:








Relocating firms decide how much to produce so as to maximize their
profit function, 𝑞𝑟 being their only choice variable. Indeed, 𝑟-firms do
not abate emissions and do not buy emission allowances. Therefore,
differently from ℎ-firms, their profit function lacks the last two terms
on the right-hand side of equation (1).
Solving the maximization problem of 𝑟-firms we get the optimal





5 See the online mathematical appendix for a detailed derivation of the
solutions.4
Fig. 1. Replicator dynamics. Parameter values: 𝑁 = 50, 𝑝 = 150, 𝛼 = 1, 𝐶𝑣ℎ = 0.6,
𝐶𝑓ℎ = 0.5, 𝐶
𝑣
𝑟 = 0.5, 𝐶
𝑓
𝑟 = 1.7, 𝜃 = 0.17, 𝑄 = 40, 𝑓 = 0.001, 𝑎 = 0.1, 𝛽 = 1.5.
According to the equation above, the marginal cost of production of the
foreign firm (𝑞𝑟𝐶𝑣𝑟 ) is equal to the output price 𝑝 at the equilibrium.
3.3. Equilibrium conditions on the output market and on the allowance
market
From the solution of the two optimization problems of ℎ-firms and
𝑟-firms described above, we can derive the equilibrium conditions on
the output market and on the permits market.
As to the output market, total supply is:
𝑆 = 𝑥𝑁𝑞∗𝑟 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑁𝑞
∗
ℎ (7)
Assuming a standard linear demand function, the equilibrium price on
the output market is:
𝑝 = 𝑝 − 𝛼[𝑥𝑁𝑞∗𝑟 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑁𝑞
∗
ℎ] (8)
where 𝛼 > 0 and 𝑝 > 0 are parameters.
As to the permits market, the aggregate demand 𝐷𝑎 is equal to the
individual demand of permits (𝑑∗𝑎 = 𝑞
∗
ℎ−𝑧
∗−𝐹 ) multiplied by the overall
number 𝑥𝑁 of ℎ-firms, that is:
𝐷𝑎 = (𝑞∗ℎ − 𝑧
∗ − 𝐹 )(1 − 𝑥)𝑁 (9)
Let us indicate with 𝑄 the number of permits issued by the regulator
(the emissions cap of the ETS). A share 𝑓 of these permits is given
for free to each ℎ-firm to prevent it from delocalizing its production.
Each ℎ-firm, therefore, receives 𝐹 = 𝑓𝑄 free permits, where 𝑓 > 0. We
assume that the regulator cannot give away all permits for free. In other
words, even in the case in which all firms stay at home ((1 − 𝑥)𝑁 = 𝑁 ,
i.e., 𝑥 = 0), the number of free permits must be lower than the total
number of permits issued by the regulator, therefore, 𝐹𝑁 < 𝑄 or,
equivalently, 𝑓 < 1∕𝑁 . The remaining permits are auctioned by the
regulator. The number of permits supplied at the auction, therefore,
is equal to the difference between the total amount of permits 𝑄 and
the number of permits that are freely allocated. The latter is given by
the number of ℎ-firms (i.e. (1 − 𝑥)𝑁) multiplied by the number of free
permits 𝐹 received by each home firm.
The equilibrium condition on the allowance market is, therefore:
(𝑞∗ℎ − 𝑧
∗ − 𝐹 )(1 − 𝑥)𝑁 = 𝑄 − 𝐹 (1 − 𝑥)𝑁
where the left-hand side represents the aggregate demand of permits
from home firms and the right-hand side is the total number of permits
actually sold by the regulator (net of those given for free).
Energy Economics 103 (2021) 105561A. Antoci et al.Fig. 2. Intertemporal evolution of relocating firms (𝑥∗), permits price (𝑎), abatement activities (𝑧∗) and permits demand (𝑑∗𝑎 ).Simplifying the common terms which appear on the right-hand side
and on the left-hand side of the previous equation, the equilibrium
condition can equivalently be re-written as follows:
(𝑞∗ℎ − 𝑧
∗)(1 − 𝑥)𝑁 = 𝑄 (10)
We assume that the regulatory authority sets a minimum price level 𝑎
(a floor price). Let us indicate with 𝑎∗ the price that clears the permits
market. If 𝑎∗ > 𝑎, then the aggregate demand of permits equals the
aggregate supply. In this case, the equilibrium condition (10) above





(1 − 𝑥)𝑁 < 𝑄 (11)
In this case, the number of permits sold in the market at the floor price
is therefore equal to the actual demand (𝑞∗ℎ − 𝑧
∗)||
|𝑎=𝑎
(1 − 𝑥)𝑁 .
3.4. Evolutionary dynamics
Let us assume that time is discrete (with 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2.. denoting the
single time periods). The share of relocating firms 𝑥 is assumed to
follow the so-called exponential replicator dynamics (cf. Kopel et al.,
2014; Bischi et al., 2015; Dieci et al., 2018):
𝑥𝑡+1 =
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑡 + (1 − 𝑥𝑡)𝑒
−𝛽𝛥𝛱𝑡
(12)
where 𝛥𝛱𝑡 = 𝛱𝑟𝑡 − 𝛱
ℎ
𝑡 indicates the profit differential between 𝑟-firms
and ℎ-firms and the parameter 𝛽 > 0 measures the speed at which firms
change their choice (relocating or staying). Equation (12) suggests that
the share of firms that will delocalize in the future (at time 𝑡+1) depends
on the share of those that relocate their activities in the present (at time
𝑡), thus indicating the existence of imitative behaviors in the selection5
of the preferred strategy (relocating or staying). Notice that if 𝛥𝛱𝑡 = 0
then 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡. In this case, therefore, the economy is at a stationary
state in which the share 𝑥 of relocating firms (and the corresponding
share 1 − 𝑥 of home firms) remains constant over time. If 𝛥𝛱𝑡 > 0
then 𝑥𝑡+1 > 𝑥𝑡. In other words, if the payoff of the strategy relocating
is higher than that of staying at home then the share of firms which
delocalize their production will tend to increase over time. The opposite
obviously occurs if 𝛥𝛱𝑡 < 0.
Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamics associated with equation (12). As the
figure shows, numerical simulations find a unique attractive inner sta-
tionary state 𝑥∗ (which is equal to 0.225), while the extreme equilibria
𝑥 = 0 and 𝑥 = 1 are repulsive. It follows that, whatever the initial
conditions of the economy, all trajectories will eventually converge to
𝑥∗.
4. Numerical simulations
In this section we perform some numerical simulations to analyze
the dynamics of the share of relocating firms, of the abatement efforts
and of the permits demand that emerge from the model. In particular,
we will examine how these variables change both over time and at
different values of some key policy parameter values, namely, the price
floor, the total number of allowances, the number of free allowances
and the level of technological efficiency. The initial parameter values
are those underlying the replicator dynamics in Fig. 1.
4.1. Time evolution of selected key variables
Let us start from a situation in which almost all firms (98.7% of total
firms) initially operate under the home ETS (𝑥 = 0.013, see Fig. 2(a)).
Under this condition and the set of parameter values indicated in
Fig. 1, the strategy relocating will be more profitable than that of
Energy Economics 103 (2021) 105561A. Antoci et al.Fig. 3. Evolution of relocating firms (𝑥∗), permits price (𝑎), abatement activities 𝑧∗, and permits demand (𝑑∗𝑝 ) at different values of the floor price (𝑎).remaining at home. This leads an increasing number of firms to move
their production elsewhere increasing the share 𝑥 until 𝑥𝑡 ≃ 0.225 at
the stationary state. The migration of firms from the home country
to other (non-ETS) jurisdictions obviously reduces the allowance price
(see Fig. 2(b)). This tends to lower, in its turn, the firms’ incentive to
invest in abatement activities and to increase the permits demand until
the two variables stabilize at their stationary state levels (around 1.7
and 1.0, respectively, see Fig. 2(c)).
To counterbalance the firms’ migration flows illustrated in the
figure, the policy-maker can intervene by modifying the value of several
policy parameters, such as the floor price level and the number of
permits allocated on the market, or by affecting the value of other
parameters, such as the marginal abatement cost (e.g. by subsidizing
investments in clean technologies). Next section illustrates the possible
effects of these policy interventions.
4.2. Effects of changes in policy variables
Let us first consider an increase in the floor price 𝑎 (see Fig. 3).
As one can reasonably expect, this will tend to increase the number
of delocalizing firms since it raises the minimum cost of purchasing
allowances. As the figure shows, however, the firms’ decision to delo-
calize their activities does not change at very low or very high levels
of the floor price. Indeed, the floor price is inactive if it is below the
market-clearing price (𝑎 ≃ 0.3 in Fig. 3). In this case, it does not
affect any of the variables taken into account which remain constant
as illustrated in the various panels of Fig. 3. As the floor price rises
above the market-clearing price, the permits’ price equals the floor
price and the two variables (measured on the axes of figure Fig. 3(c))
keep growing hand-in-hand with further increases in the minimum
price. The increase in permits’ price induces a progressive migration6
flow towards other non-ETS jurisdictions (𝑥∗ increases in Fig. 3(a)),
a fall in the permits’ demand and more abatement activities to avoid
paying higher compliance costs (cf. Fig. 3(c)).
When the floor price gets sufficiently high (𝑎 ≃ 0.4), the demand of
permits gets to zero. As a consequence, firms’ abatement and relocation
decisions become independent of the permits’ price (as firms do not
buy permits any longer). Therefore, both 𝑧∗ and 𝑥∗ become constant
again and further increases in the floor price will have no effect on the
variables taken into account. This can explain why all variables shown
in Fig. 3 (excluding the permits’ price) change only for intermediate
values of the floor price, while they remain constant if the floor price
is very low or very high.
Let us now analyse the effects of changes in the total number of
permits 𝑄 (the emissions cap). In most ETS the emissions cap tends to
become more stringent over time, therefore in what follows we will
describe the simulation results as 𝑄 decreases (i.e. moving from the
right to the left along the horizontal axis). As one could reasonably
expect, the permits price increases as the emissions cap falls (Fig. 4(b)).
This provokes a reduction in the individual permits’ demand and
an increase in the abatement activities to avoid the higher costs of
purchasing allowances (Fig. 4(c)). Moreover, the more stringent cap
and the consequent higher permits price induce a larger share of firms
to delocalize their activities to escape the higher ETS-related costs
(Fig. 4(a)). A reduction in the emissions cap will thus provoke more
abatement under the ETS but also less firms subject to the ETS as
long as they can flee away towards other jurisdictions with laxer or
no regulations.
We then examined how the variables of interest react to changes in
the share 𝑓 and thus also in the number 𝐹 = 𝑓𝑄 of permits allocated for
free. A higher share of free permits induces less firms to delocalize their
production and, therefore, more firms to stay at home (see Fig. 5(a)).
Energy Economics 103 (2021) 105561A. Antoci et al.Fig. 4. Evolution of relocating firms (𝑥∗), permits price (𝑎), abatement activities 𝑧∗, and permits’ demand (𝑑∗𝑝 ) at different values of the emissions cap (𝑄).This tends to increase – ceteris paribus – the aggregate demand of
permits and thus also the permits price (see Fig. 5(b)), which raises
in its turn the abatement activities and lowers the individual demand
of permits (Fig. 5(c)). Simulation results seem to suggest that a larger
number of free allocations can be effective in reducing carbon leak-
age and inducing higher emissions abatement. However, the variables
taken into account show more limited variations as compared to the
simulations shown above, suggesting that an increase in 𝑓 may have a
lower impact on the system than a change in the emissions cap or in
the floor price.
Finally, let us consider the possible dynamics deriving from changes
in the parameter 𝜃. Recall that this parameter measures the
(in)efficiency of the abatement technologies, the marginal abatement
cost being 𝜃𝑧. Differently from the other policy variables considered
above, the value of 𝜃 cannot be directly controlled by the regulatory
authority. The latter, however, can influence it through proper inter-
ventions such as subsidies or tax credits to green investments. Similarly
to what already done when commenting changes in the emissions cap
𝑄, even in this case it is convenient to interpret the figures looking
at a reduction in the parameter (namely, moving leftward along the
horizontal axis), as technological abatement efficiency tends to improve
(i.e. 𝜃 tends to fall) over time. As Fig. 6(c) shows, lower abatement costs
induce firms to abate more emissions (𝑧∗ increases) rather than buying
permits. This reduces – ceteris paribus – the demand of permits (𝑑∗𝑎
decreases) as well as the permits’ price (see Fig. 6(b)). The increased
capacity to abate emissions at a lower cost and the reduction in the
permits’ price induce more firms to stay in the country, progressively
reducing also 𝑥∗ until this variable eventually gets to zero when the
marginal abatement cost is extremely low. This is clearly illustrated in
Fig. 6(a) in which the curve reaches the horizontal axis along which
𝑥∗ = 0 (that is, all firms stay at home) when 𝜃 < 0.1.7
Summing up, simulation results suggest that if the regulatory au-
thority aims at reducing delocalization and increasing abatement it
should enhance the number of free permits and/or adopt measures that
contribute to lower the cost of green technologies. The latter measure,
however, appears to be more effective having a larger impact both on
𝑥∗ and on 𝑧∗. Opposite effects emerge, instead, from the other policy
measures taken into account, namely, a reduction in the emissions
cap and an increase in the floor price. Both measures promote higher
abatement efforts but induce a larger migration flow towards non-ETS
jurisdictions leading to more carbon leakage.
5. Conclusions
Emissions trading is gaining increasing importance around the
world as a suitable instrument to address climate change. In the absence
of a global carbon market, however, unilateral carbon policies may end
up causing carbon leakage effects, the more so if carbon prices are to
increase in the future to achieve more ambitious emissions abatement
targets.
Carbon leakage may threaten not only the environmental effective-
ness of domestic climate policies, but also their very existence. Indeed,
if polluting activities simply shift elsewhere as a result of unilateral
climate policies, this may adversely affect domestic production and
employment without having significant impacts on global emissions,
which eventually reduces also the inner acceptability of the domestic
climate policy.
Given the existence of significant differences in climate policy am-
bition across jurisdictions, increasing attention has been devoted in the
literature to the possible leakage effects of a unilateral carbon pricing
instrument such as the ETS.
Energy Economics 103 (2021) 105561A. Antoci et al.Fig. 5. Evolution of relocating firms (𝑥∗), permits price (𝑎), abatement activities 𝑧∗, and permits’ demand (𝑑∗𝑝 ) at different values of the share of free allowances (𝑓 ).Differently from previous theoretical studies on this issue, this paper
adopts an evolutionary approach to address the problem. In our view,
this approach – which has been largely used in other contexts – can pro-
vide interesting and possibly innovative insights to this research strand.
In fact, evolutionary models allow to describe myopic and imitative
behaviors that are frequently observed in the economic systems and can
characterize also the firms’ choice on where to locate their production
activities.
For this purpose, we propose a simple evolutionary model in which
ETS-regulated firms have to decide whether to stay at home or shift
their production abroad to some other non-ETS country. Firms tend to
imitate the others and adopt the best-performing strategy, namely, the
alternative that results more profitable on average among all firms. We
assume that both the output market and the carbon market are perfectly
competitive. The latter market has a floor price to prevent price from
getting too low and admits free allocation of a share of the allowances
to prevent/reduce carbon leakage.
To show the dynamics resulting from the model, we performed
numerical simulations on a few key parameters which reveal some
interesting insights.
First, a more stringent emissions cap promotes emissions abatement
under the ETS through an increase in the price of allowances but it also
induces a higher share of firms to delocalize their production activities
following the (more profitable) experience of other relocating firms.
The same applies to an increase in the floor price. The latter, however,
turns out to be effective only at intermediate values of the parameter:
indeed, firms’ behavior is unchanged if the floor price is too low (below
the market-clearing price and, therefore, inactive) or too high (so that
no firm is willing to stay at home).
Second, the regulator can increase the share of permits allocated
for free to induce more firms to stay (or come back home) and thus8
avoid carbon leakage. However, numerical simulations suggest that
this intervention seems to have a relatively low impact on firms’
behavior. A more effective policy measure turns out to be promoting
technological improvements that reduce the marginal cost of emissions
abatement. Under the parameters set adopted in the simulations, when
the marginal abatement cost gets very low the latter policy may even-
tually lead all firms to stay home. In this case, therefore, one strategy
(stay) spreads across all agents who operate the same choice due to the
imitation process characterizing the evolutionary model.
The analytical model proposed in this paper gives a deliberately
simplified representation of the real economy, therefore its results
should be taken with much caution. However, in our opinion the
‘‘toy’’ model described above provides a general framework that can
be easily extended in several directions. For instance, since carbon
markets are rapidly spreading around the world, it would be interesting
to investigate the results emerging in the case of multiple ETSs which
differ in terms of floor price level, number of free allocations and/or
exemptions criteria. The extension of the analysis to multiple countries
would also allow to consider the role of potential spillover effects across
countries. Indeed, the decision to relocate abroad may be influenced
by the relevance of the destination country as trading partner and the
existence of a similar policy instrument/mix in that country. Firms may
decide to move to foreign countries not only for the existence of lower
production costs as assumed here, but also because the host countries
share similar environmental policies, which may ease doing business
abroad. If so, the adoption of a policy instrument like the ETS in one
country might have spillover effects in terms of policy across countries,
leading other jurisdictions to adopt similar policies if they want to
remain among the trading partners of the country. This aspect may
play a key role in the relationships across countries, as shown by the
recent debate around the EU proposal of introducing a Carbon Border
Adjustment Mechanism.
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petitiveness effects of the ETS within the country. In other words,
another fruitful research line could be to examine not only multiple
countries with different ETSs, but also multiple sectors within each
country. For this purpose, rather than assuming a unique type of home
firms, we could distinguish two firms (say, ℎ1 and ℎ2) corresponding
to two sectors (regulated vs. unregulated by the ETS) and/or with
different abatement parameters (𝜃1 and 𝜃2) and thus different marginal
abatement costs. Indeed, existing ETSs do not cover all sectors within
a jurisdiction but just a share of them (corresponding, for instance, to
approximately 40 per cent of total GHG emissions in the case of the
EU ETS). More stringent climate policies may cause structural changes
within a country, leading to a shift from more to less carbon-intensive
sectors with a related shift in the sectors’ employment levels. The
dynamic nature of the model allows to capture the size and speed of the
transition dynamics towards cleaner sectors and jobs within a country
and to assess how this process is affected by carbon leakage risks.
Another potentially interesting extension of the model would be
to enrich the analysis by introducing a third strategy at disposal of
home firms, that is, investing in clean technologies. While in the present
model home firms are assumed to be polluting and have, therefore, to
buy emission permits, we might allow home firms to choose between
two alternative strategies, a dirty and a clean one. Firms adopting
a clean (green) strategy can operate in the country without buying
emission permits. In such a context, one could analyze the impact of the
ETS on the interaction dynamics of green, dirty, and relocating firms
in a three-dimensional system.
Finally, future research should be devoted to examining how the
pollution dynamics emerging from the model might affect the strin-
gency of the ETS, inducing the regulator to adjust the cap reduction rate
and/or possibly phase out free allowances according to the dynamics9
of the polluting emissions. While these and other questions could be
addressed within the analytical framework presented here, this article
just wanted to move a first step in a new research direction that can
enrich the debate on the carbon leakage effects of ETSs.
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